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---
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Tag: ["📈", "🇮🇷", "🛢️", "💸"]
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Date: 2025-01-14
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DocType: "WebClipping"
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Hierarchy:
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TimeStamp: 2025-01-14
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Link: https://www.reuters.com/graphics/IRAN-OIL/zjpqngedmvx/
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location:
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CollapseMetaTable: true
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---
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Parent:: [[@News|News]]
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Read:: 🟥
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---
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```button
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name Save
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type command
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action Save current file
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id Save
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```
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^button-HowIranmovessanctionedoilaroundtheworldNSave
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# How Iran moves sanctioned oil around the world
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Despite some of the West’s toughest sanctions, Iran has built a roaring global trade for its oil. It relies on a shadow fleet of tankers that conceal their activities to skirt sanctions, and willing buyers in Asia to keep its economy afloat and to finance anti-Western militias in the Middle East.
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Tehran's oil exports brought in $53 billion in 2023 and $54 billion a year earlier, according to U.S. Energy Information Administration estimates, and output during 2024 was running at its highest since 2018, based on OPEC data.
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It was former U.S. President Donald Trump who ditched the West's nuclear deal with Iran and reimposed sanctions on Iranian oil in 2018. Set to return to the White House in January, Trump is expected to once again target Iran's oil industry with "maximum pressure", say Iranian, Arab and Western officials.
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While Iran's methods have been well guarded, the leaked emails exposed unusually granular detail about the day-to-day workings of a company that has helped keep Tehran’s multibillion dollar oil industry alive.
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Hacking group PRANA Network leaked the Sahara Thunder emails in February last year because it wanted to lift the lid on Iran’s circumvention of Western sanctions, two of the hackers told Reuters.
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In April, the United States [sanctioned Sahara Thunder](https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy2295), labelling it a “front company” for Iran’s government which supported its elite Revolutionary Guards with a vast shipping network.
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Sahara Thunder is based in Tehran and describes itself as an import-export, construction and contracting firm in sectors including oil and gas, according to an archived version of its website.
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Sahara Thunder’s email addresses were no longer active when Reuters reached out for comment and the news agency was unable to determine whether it is still in business. Sahara Thunder’s website now brings up a Chinese sports gambling page. Emails to people and addresses associated with the company in the data leak did not get replies.
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Iranian officials did not respond to requests for comment.
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Extracts from emails between Sahara Thunder and its partners showed how they shifted their cargoes from vessel to vessel, forged documents, painted ships with new identities, faked tracking signals to disguise their locations, and took painstaking measures to avoid any trace of Iran.
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Reuters shared its reporting with Roke Intelligence, a part of British research and development firm Roke which specialises in monitoring sanctions evasion for clients in the maritime industry. It independently verified many of the findings, located ships with satellite imaging, found the likely offloading points for vessels, and identified manipulated vessel tracking data.
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Reuters also shared with Iraqi officials the documents used by the Remy to pass its Iranian oil off as Iraqi. Besides the certificate of origin, it had an Iraqi bill of lading, a cargo manifest, port clearance and other paperwork. An Iraqi customs official told Reuters the documents were poor forgeries while SOMO, the body responsible for oil exports, said there was no record of the ship loading crude from any of Iraq’s ports.
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### The fleet
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From March 2022 to February 2024, Sahara Thunder helped deliver 18 different sanctioned oil cargoes via its own and business partners’ vessels - a fleet of 34 ships, according to the Reuters analysis of the leaked emails.
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Ships such as the Remy and the Wen Yao ferried sanctioned crude between continents or formed links in chains of voyages stretching around the globe. Vessels siphoned parcels of oil from other ships in the Sahara Thunder network such as the Dune, a very large crude carrier capable of carrying 2.2 million barrels - twice as much as the Remy.
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The Remy was the name of the oil tanker recorded in shipping databases, but it typically switched to using the fake name Deep Ocean when taking on Iranian oil, according to Sahara Thunder’s emails.
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The Remy under its former name Asian Spirit as seen at Rotterdam on July 10, 2016, via MarineTraffic/Roland Delhaxhe
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The Wen Yao under its former name New Spirit, as seen in Singapore on Nov. 21, 2008, via MarineTraffic/Hans Rosenkranz
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Other ships shuttled crude back and forth across the Gulf. In total, Sahara Thunder’s crude cargoes were moved between vessels more than 60 times as they wended their way over thousands of miles to their ultimate buyers, mostly in China.
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Reuters pieced together the fleet of vessels run by Sahara Thunder and its business partners, and mapped out how much oil was transferred between each of the ships in the network.
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There were 92 owner or operating companies for the 34 ships involved with Sahara Thunder's activities during the period covered by the emails, according to the leak and the public shipping database Equasis.
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Reuters contacted 79 of them and was unable to reach 13. Ten companies replied. Eight said they were not involved. Two said they only handled the ships’ technical management and had no knowledge of chartering or voyages.
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### Go East
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Most of the oil moved by Sahara Thunder was Iranian. But the company was also hired to help deliver oil from other countries forced by sanctions to operate in a shadow economy, blocked from Western banking, insurance and buyers. Ships in the Sahara Thunder network including the Remy and Wen Yao transported oil from state-owned companies in Russia and Venezuela, according to the leaked emails, helping them skirt sanctions.
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Most of the oil Sahara Thunder moved ended up in China.
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The U.S. Treasury did not comment.
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China’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs told Reuters it was not familiar with Sahara Thunder’s business in China.
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“China has consistently and resolutely opposed the U.S.'s illegal and unreasonable unilateral sanctions on Iran and other countries and its long-arm jurisdiction,” the ministry said.
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### A highly lucrative trade
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Iran is under what the United States’ Congressional Research Service calls “arguably the most extensive and comprehensive set of sanctions” the U.S. maintains. Allies such as the European Union, Britain and others mirror Washington’s efforts.
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These sanctions have come in response to Iran’s nuclear programme, its backing of militant groups in the Middle East, brutal crackdowns on protests and, more recently, its support of Russia as the latter wages war in Ukraine.
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They are designed to throttle Iran’s access to energy, finance and military markets, undermine the economy and cut off businesses and officials from much of the West.
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As a result of the sanctions, some of Iran’s oil trade has transferred from state entities to companies such as Sahara Thunder and [other networks](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/fuel-oil-smuggling-network-rakes-1-billion-iran-its-proxies-2024-12-03/) that can [work around the restrictions](https://www.reuters.com/world/middle-east/irans-revolutionary-guards-extend-control-over-tehrans-oil-exports-sources-say-2024-12-18/) and bring in sorely needed foreign currency.
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“You have opaque networks involved in a highly lucrative trade, and now U.S. officials are forced to play a game of whack-a-mole to try to stay ahead of them,” said Esfandyar Batmanghelidj, chief executive of the Bourse & Bazaar Foundation, a think-tank in London that tracks Iran’s oil sector.
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## Defying the elements
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## New name, same game
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## Cash economy
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Locked out of Western banking systems by sanctions, Sahara Thunder still had to settle payments for incidental costs outside Iran such as for refuelling, the emails showed.
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Before the Remy could load a new oil cargo from the Dune, it sailed to the United Arab Emirates, where Emirati firm Marin Ocean Refined Oil Products Trading refuelled the ship, according to emails between the company and Sahara Thunder.
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When it came to settlement, the company told Sahara Thunder to deliver 4.3 million dirham ($1.2 million) to its agent - in cash.
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In August 2023, one firm assisting in ship-to-ship transfer operations also asked Sahara Thunder to give $105,000 in cash to a customs clearance clerk in the UAE.
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Reuters was unable to determine from the emails whether the two payments were made.
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Marin Ocean did not respond to a request for comment. Reuters was unable to reach the agents and other partner firms for comment.
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A UAE official did not comment specifically on Sahara Thunder’s activities in the country. “The UAE adheres to, and strictly enforces, international laws and UN mandated sanctions, alongside agreements established with international partners,” the official said.
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## Iran meets world
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Sahara Thunder’s trade went beyond Iranian crude, including oil from other sanctions-hit nations such as Russia and Venezuela.
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While Sahara Thunder’s major crude deals were often carried out by the Remy, some shipments relied on other vessels in its network.
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In August 2022, one of those ships came calling at Venezuela’s Jose Terminal.
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The Won was there under Sahara Thunder’s orders to load 1.9 million barrels of Merey crude, according to the leaked emails. The ship’s IMO number was 9288098.
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But shipping databases have no record of a tanker with that name at the time. Nor does that IMO number exist.
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### Moscow mule
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By December 2023, the Remy was on the other side of the world, preparing its last cargo before the Sahara Thunder leak. This time, the crude was Russian.
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Moscow has been under ever-tightening sanctions since its full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022, and in need of buyers for its oil. Sahara Thunder was there to help.
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In December, the U.S. sanctioned five more ships in the fleet tied to Sahara Thunder, bringing the total to 21. Thirteen vessels remain unsanctioned. One of those is the Remy which, according to shipping databases, now goes by the name Wilma II.
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A previous version of this graphic included a satellite image which wrongly named the vessel next to the MS Enola as the Remy. The satellite image has been replaced with the correct one which shows the Remy next to the MS Enola on March 24, 2023.
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In February 2024, hackers leaked more than 10,000 emails and their attachments from Sahara Thunder. Reuters ran the emails through Google’s Pinpoint, a research tool for journalists and academics that analyses large sets of documents and highlights frequently repeated key words, names and phrases.
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Reuters then sorted the emails into sets, including for each ship identified and for each ship-to-ship transfer, as well as by key companies, contracts, and mentions of specific phrases such as those relating to China, Russia, Venezuela and various countries in the Middle East.
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Reuters identified emails that contained GPS coordinates, including some ships’ daily location updates, allowing reporters to pinpoint the exact location of ship-to-ship transfers and chart movements of Sahara Thunder vessels like the Remy, even when ships turned off or spoofed their AIS.
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Communications, contracts and documents were then matched to the relevant trades to construct a timeline of Sahara Thunder’s activities.
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Reuters then shared its findings with Roke Intelligence, which independently verified many of the ship-to-ship transfers and ship movements, and identified satellite images of the transactions, ships’ likely offloading points and instances of spoofing.
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PRANA Network’s Sahara Thunder leak at [https://simorgh.io/](https://simorgh.io/); Satellite image analysis and ship tracking analysis via Roke Intelligence; Ship tracking data from LSEG and Kpler.
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James Pearson in London, Ahmed Rasheed in Baghdad, Tim Gardner in Washington, Michelle Nichols in New York, Chen Aizhu and Jeslyn Lerh in Singapore, Colleen Howe in Beijing, Rozanna Latiff in Kuala Lumpur, and Parisa Hafezi and Alexander Cornwell in Dubai
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Jon McClure, Richard Valdmanis and David Clarke
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`$= dv.el('center', 'Source: ' + dv.current().Link + ', ' + dv.current().Date.toLocaleString("fr-FR"))` |
